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 A review of the Quarterly Economic Commentary (the ‘Commentary’) 
forecasts produced by The Economic and Social Research Institute 
(ESRI) was last published in the Autumn 1995 Commentary. On that 
occasion, the forecasting record over the 1990 to 1994 period was 
reviewed. It was found that forecasts were generally quite accurate 
and unbiased, though a slightly pessimistic tendency was in evidence. 
On this occasion, the forecasts contained in the Commentaries relating 
to the 1994 to 2004 period are examined. At the core of this 
examination is a comparison of forecasts made in relation to the 
actual outturn. This analysis also seeks to identify patterns and biases 
in forecasts, and attempts to provide explanations for the measured 
divergences between forecasts and outturns. 
1. 
Introduction
 
 Each Commentary provides dozens of forecasts in relation to 
elements of the national accounts, public finances, prices, balance of 
payments and employment out to a maximum of two years into the 
future. Given that four Commentaries are issued every year, evaluating 
every forecast for every indicator relating to every Commentary would 
be unnecessarily costly in terms of time and effort, as well as being 
unduly cumbersome for the reader. Such a comprehensive study 
risks masking the most relevant results in terms of the quality of 
Commentary forecasts. For this reason, only a relatively small selection 
of Commentary forecasts is examined. 
2. 
Methodology
Three key economic indicators are examined. Those chosen were 
selected because of their suitability in portraying the state of the Irish 
economy, as well as being diverse enough to capture a broad 
perspective on the economic well being of the country. These are the 
real growth rate of Gross National Product (GNP), the rate of 
inflation and the unemployment rate. 
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In performing a review of a particular forecasting record, the 
danger exists that the reviewer has scope to skew the evaluation in 
order to create misleading perceptions about the forecasts’ quality 
for reasons of personal or sectional interest. This scope stems from 
the fact that for any one year, and for any one indicator, numerous 
forecasts made at different stages exist. This is true of the 
Commentary, where for every indicator for a given year, approximately 
eight forecasts are available. In order to ensure an analysis that is 
systematic, impartial and readably brief, two Commentaries per year are 
examined. 
The first to be considered is the Commentary in which the earliest 
forecasts for all three indicators for a particular year appear. This is 
normally the Commentary issued in the summer of the preceding year 
(the ‘initial’ forecast).1  
The second Commentary looked at is normally published in the 
spring of the year under review (the ‘final’ forecast).2 There are two 
reasons why this Commentary is chosen. First, time has elapsed since 
the initial forecast has been made. New information that is more 
relevant to the forecast being made will have become available, 
providing a basis for forecast revisions if required. This opens up the 
possibility of significant differences existing between the initial and 
final forecast. Second, and more importantly, the ‘Spring’ forecast is 
the latest forecast not to be significantly contaminated by the release 
of official statistics relating to the period being forecast. For 
example, a forecast of GNP growth for 2004 made in autumn of 
that year will already incorporate preliminary GNP figures for the 
first half of the year provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). 
It is, therefore, as much a result as a forecast. Selecting forecasts 
published in the earliest Commentary in the year under review is an 
attempt to minimise this problem, while simultaneously allowing a 
chronologically advanced forecast to be examined.  
In terms of an appropriate benchmark against which to evaluate 
forecasts, official statistics published by the CSO are assumed to be 
the best available measure of the actual outturn. GNP growth rates 
for 1994 to 2004 are taken from the National Income and Expenditure 
(NIE) report. The figure for the rate of inflation is calculated using 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Up until 1997, the unemployment rate 
is obtained from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Thereafter, the 
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) is used. The Commentary’s 
forecasting record is then compared to that of other leading 
forecasting institutions, namely the Central Bank of Ireland and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). 
1 This is normally published as the Summer Commentary. However, a July Commentary 
was issued in 1997, a September Commentary appeared in 1996 and an August 
Commentary in 1999. Initial forecasts for 2001 and 2002 were published in the 
preceding March’s Commentary. The initial forecasts for 2003 and 2004 appeared in 
the Spring 2002 and Spring 2003 Commentaries respectively. 
2 This is normally published as the Spring Commentary. A February Commentary 
appeared in 1996 and 1999, April Commentaries were released in 1997 and 1998, 
while March Commentaries were issued in 2000 and 2001. 
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3.1 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
3. 
Results In terms of GNP growth forecasts, the most striking pattern is the 
underestimation of growth during the period between 1994 and 
2000 (see Figure 1). Over this period, the initial forecast 
underestimated GNP growth by an average of just over 2.8 
percentage points. The final forecasts were all at least as accurate as 
the initial ones. However, the final forecast error remained 
significant, averaging 2.4 percentage points.  
After 2000, forecasting accuracy was more volatile. Forecasts 
exceeded outturns in both 2001 and 2002, while the trend of 
underestimation was reverted to in 2003 and 2004. Final forecasts 
for 2001, 2003 and 2004 were actually less accurate than initial 
forecasts, with the final forecast for 2003 in particular showing a 
deterioration of 1.8 percentage points. The final forecast for 2002 
was 2.1 percentage points more accurate than the initial forecast.  
Reflecting these facts, the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) over 
the 1994 to 2004 period was 2.2 percentage points for the initial 
GNP growth forecasts, and 2.0 percentage points for the final 
forecasts. As regards forecasts made for the 2001 to 2004 period, 
relatively substantial revisions took place between the initial and final 
forecast of GNP growth. As a final note on GNP, forecasts for 2001 
were particularly noteworthy for two reasons. First, forecasts of 
GNP growth made for that year overestimated the outturn, reversing 
the pattern of underestimation observed up until then. Also, 2001 
was one of only two years under examination in which the final 
forecast of GNP growth was significantly less accurate than the 
initial one. 
 
Figure 1: Actual and Forecast GNP Growth 1994 to 2004 
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3.2 INFLATION 
Inflation forecasts over the 1994 to 2004 period predicted the 
outturn relatively accurately (see Figure 2). The MAD was 1.0 
percentage point for initial forecasts, and a smaller 0.5 percentage 
points for final forecasts. Generally, with the exceptions of 1998 and 
2003, final forecasts were more accurate than initial ones. From 1994 
to 1999, there was a slight tendency for forecasts to overestimate the 
inflation rate. In 2000 and 2001, forecasts substantially 
underestimated the rate of inflation. In 2000, the initial forecast 
underestimated the actual rate of inflation by 3.6 percentage points. 
The final forecast for 2000 was 2 percentage points closer to the 
outturn, but still 1.6 percentage points lower than the eventual 
inflation figure. The final forecast for 2000 represents the largest 
forecast revision to occur in the period under review. In 2001, the 
initial forecast was 2.2 percentage points lower than the actual 
outturn. The final forecast was a sizeable 1.5 percentage point 
upward revision on this, but remained lower than the outturn by 0.7 
percentage points. This pattern is in common with GNP forecasts 
discussed above, where substantial forecast revisions took place 
during the early part of this decade compared with during the 1990s. 
In 2003, forecasts again exceeded the eventual rate of inflation for 
the first time since the 1990s. 
Figure 2: Actual and Forecast Inflation Rate 1994 to 2004 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Year
In
fla
tio
n 
R
at
e 
%
 
Initial Forecast Final Forecast Outturn
3.3 UNEMPLOYMENT 
The most notable characteristic regarding forecasts of the 
unemployment rate over this period is the tendency for forecasts to 
overestimate the measured outturn (see Figure 3). This is particularly 
true of the 1994 to 2000 period, when the initial forecast was usually 
about 2 percentage points higher than the published unemployment 
figure. The Commentary appears to have been relatively successful in 
terms of identifying the nature of the decline in the rate of 
unemployment from 1994 to 2001, as movements in forecasts were 
roughly in tandem with changes in the actual rate over this time 
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frame. On only one occasion, in 2003, was the final forecast less 
accurate than the initial one. Between 1994 and 2004, the MAD of 
initial unemployment forecasts was 1.6 percentage points. The 
corresponding figure for final forecasts was 0.7 percentage points. 
 
Figure 3: Actual and Forecast Unemployment Rate 1994 to 2004 
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3.4 COMPARISON WITH OTHER FORECASTERS 
In Tables 1, 2 and 3, the Spring Commentary’s forecasts are compared 
with the forecasts of the Central Bank of Ireland in its Spring 
Quarterly Bulletin. The Spring forecast was also compared with 
forecasts contained in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) June Economic Outlook. It is important to 
note that forecasts from different institutes are not directly 
comparable as they were not all formulated at the exact same time of 
year. 
Table 1: GNP Growth Rate Forecast Comparisons3
Year ESRI Central Bank OECD Outturn 
(CSO) 
1994 5.0 4.0 3.4 6.3 
1995 6.0 5.5 4.5 8.2 
1996 5.0 5.25 5.0 7.4 
1997 5.5 5.5 5.0 9.3 
1998 6.75 6.5 6.3 7.7 
1999 5.75 6.5 6.4 8.5 
2000 5.9 8.25 6.1 9.5 
2001 6.1 7.0 7.0 3.9 
2002 3.1 3.0 6.4 2.7 
2003 3.0 1.75 5.1 5.1 
2004 3.3 3.25 4.2 4.0 
 
3 For years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2004, the OECD did not produce GNP 
forecasts. For those years, the OECD’s GDP forecast appears in Table 1 instead. 
Table 2: Inflation Rate Forecast Comparisons 
Year ESRI Central Bank OECD Outturn 
(CSO) 
1994 2.25 2.7 3.1 2.3 
1995 2.75 2.5 2.5 2.6 
1996 2.25 2.5 3.0 1.7 
1997 1.75 2.3 2.4 1.4 
1998 2.75 2.8 2.7 2.3 
1999 2.0 1.5 3.3 1.7 
2000 4.0 4.0 2.8 5.6 
2001 4.2 4.5 3.8 4.9 
2002 4.2 4.3 3.8 4.7 
2003 4.3 3.8 3.1 3.5 
2004 1.8 2.0 3.2 2.2 
 
Table 3: Unemployment Rate Forecast Comparisons 
Year ESRI Central Bank OECD Outturn 
(CSO) 
1994 15.25 15.25 20.0 14.7 
1995 14.0 13.75 15.4 12.2 
1996 11.75 11.75 13.6 11.9 
1997 10.75 11.5 12.2 10.3 
1998 8.5 9.5 10.5 7.6 
1999 6.5 6.5 8.2 5.6 
2000 4.7 4.7 5.9 4.3 
2001 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.9 
2002 4.6 4.6 3.9 4.4 
2003 5.5 5.8 4.9 4.7 
2004 4.9 5.0 5.2 4.5 
 
 Understanding how the Commentary’s forecasts are prepared is the 
first step on the road to developing an explanation of its forecasting 
record. The Commentary’s forecasts are short-term ones, in that a 
horizon of less than two years is at play. Short-term economic 
fluctuations are more susceptible to unpredictable factors and tend 
to be less amenable to formal statistical and econometric modelling. 
This is partly due to the fact that the short-term course of the 
economy is dictated more by demand side than supply side factors. 
The demand side, in turn, depends to a large degree upon intangible 
determinants such as consumers’ and investors’ expectations and 
confidence, which are quite abstract in terms of their measurability.  
4. 
Explaining the 
Commentary’s 
Forecasting 
Record 
Given this situation, quantitative forecasting methods are drawn 
upon in the formulation of Commentary forecasts, but judgement 
based, qualitative forecasting techniques are also invoked. These 
techniques draw heavily on the mix of published data and a wider 
spectrum of other relevant information. The consensus as regards 
the international environment, and the likely trajectory of interest 
rates and exchange rates is especially important in framing forecasts 
for Ireland given the open nature of the economy.  
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One very significant factor affecting the forecasting environment 
since 1997 has been the increased availability of CSO data relating to 
the Irish economy. Since that year, more economic series have been 
published and existing series have been published more frequently. 
Prior to 1997, the CPI was compiled once every quarter but now 
appears on a monthly basis. The annual Labour Force Survey has been 
replaced by the Quarterly National Household Survey, while quarterly 
GNP figures have been available since 1997, as opposed to annually 
which was the case prior to then. This has provided the forecasting 
community with more information to work with. This is important 
because it allows a greater understanding of short-term economic 
dynamics to be garnered, and allows critical points in the economic 
cycle to be identified in a more timely fashion.  
Returning to the forecasts themselves, in terms of the GNP 
growth, the repeated underestimation over the 1994 to 2000 period 
is notable. The fact that early outturns substantially exceeding these 
rates failed to translate into significant upward revisions in growth 
forecasts suggests that the Commentary was rather cautious about the 
potential for such large rates of growth to be sustained.  
A turning point in the economic cycle was reached in 2001, 
characterised by a rapid deceleration of GNP growth and an increase 
in the rate of unemployment. The forecasts in the Commentary during 
this period highlights the dangers posed to forecasters by the 
incidence of turning points in the economic cycle and their often 
sudden and unpredictable occurrence. The Commentary’s initial 
forecast for 2001 was too high, and its final forecast for that year 
was even higher. The Commentary failed to anticipate the severity and 
duration of this deceleration, with both forecasts for 2002 and 2003 
being too optimistic, but the fact that final forecasts were reduced 
significantly suggests that the Commentary eventually incorporated the 
extent of the slowdown.  
Another important issue attaching to GNP forecasts is the 
incidence of revisions to the official national accounts. National 
accounts data are revised on numerous occasions after the 
publication of preliminary figures, and final results may not be 
arrived at until several years afterwards. The resulting distortions and 
opacities have obvious negative consequences for the forecaster. 
This problem was demonstrated most dramatically in 2002, when 
initial NIE accounts showed GDP growth of 6.9 per cent and GNP 
growth of only 0.1 per cent for that year. Latest figures for 2002 now 
suggest growth of 6.1 per cent and 2.7 per cent respectively in the 
two measures. A flavour of the type of revision which can occur is 
given in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: National Income and Expenditure (NIE) GDP Growth Rates 
 Estimated GDP Volume Growth Rate for Year: 
NIE 
Edition 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1990 4.5 6.4 7.1       
1991 4.9 6.5 8.3 2.5      
1992 4.2 6.5 9.1 2.6 4.9     
1993 4.3 7.4 8.6 2.9 5.0 4.0    
1994 4.3 6.1 7.8 2.2 3.9 3.1 6.7   
1995    2.1 4.0 3.1 6.5 10.3  
1996    1.9 3.9 3.1 7.0 10.4 7.7 
1997     4.2 3.1 7.3 11.1 7.4 
 
One of the reasons why the Commentary’s forecasting record on 
inflation was so commendable over the 1994 to 1999 period is 
because this was a benign forecasting environment characterised by 
low and stable inflation. The sudden upsurge in the inflation rate in 
2000 was not immediately anticipated, with the initial forecast for 
that year proving far too low. The Commentary appears to have 
identified some but not all of this acceleration in producing its final 
forecast, and succeeded in revising its prediction significantly 
upwards, even though this forecast was still too low. 
The tendency of the Commentary to overestimate the 
unemployment rate during the 1990s is in line with the cautious 
pessimism exhibited during that period, as manifested in its GNP 
growth forecasts.  
 
 In judging the Commentary’s forecasting record, it is generally true to 
say that forecasts erred too much on the side of caution during the 
1990s, and were a little too optimistic thereafter. Another interesting 
aspect of Commentary forecasting behaviour is the fact that revisions 
during the 1990s tended to be minor, while some of those occurring 
more recently have been sizeable. One explanation is that a more 
volatile forecasting environment has prevailed in recent times, both 
in terms of macroeconomic circumstances and wider geopolitical 
factors. Specifically, these include the ‘Dot Com’ bubble’s collapse, 
the US recession, the outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease, the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the 
subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
5. 
Conclusion
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